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COMMENTS
IN RE CHEESEMAN A JUDICIAL REVISION OF VIRGINIA'S
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION LAWS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 was the first major revision of
federal bankruptcy law in over forty years.2 An important goal of the Act
is to provide the debtor with a "meaningful fresh start."' To that end, the
Bankruptcy Act provides liberalized allowances in amounts and types of
property that a debtor may hold exempt from creditors in an insolvency
proceeding. Under section 522 subsection (b) of the Act, however, a state
is permitted to "opt out" of the federal exemption scheme and prescribe
under its own law the exemptions a debtor may claim.4 Virginia is among
those states which have chosen to "opt out" of the federal scheme.5
In a 1981 decision, In re Cheeseman,6 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the terms "householder" or "head of a family" in the Virginia exemption provisions should be interpreted to allow a homestead
exemption to each spouse in a joint proceeding, so long as both contribute
to the maintenance of the household.7 The effect of this holding is to
double the amount of the exemption available under Virginia law in cases
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter referred to as the.Act].
2. 124 CONG. REC. H11,115 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Butler).
3. Id. The purpose of bankruptcy is to give the debtor "a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). Therefore, the debtor must be
permitted to retain a sufficient amount of property to prevent his becoming a ward of the
state, and to allow him to maintain his existence as an independent economic unit. See
Ulrich, Virginia's Exemption Statutes-The Need for Reform and a ProposedRevision, 37
WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 127, 129-30 (1980). See generally Comment, Protectionof a Debtor's
"FreshStart" Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH. U.L. Rav. 843 (1979).
4. Section 522 provides in pertinent part:
(b)... [A]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate either(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State
law that is applicable to the debtor. . . specifically does not so authorize; or, in the
alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of
this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of filing ....
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)-(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
6. 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981).
7. Id. at 62-63.
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which meet these criteria. This comment will analyze the Cheeseman decision in relation to Virginia precedent and the legislative intent of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978. It will also show how Cheeseman emphasizes the
need for a revision of Virginia's bankruptcy law. In addition, this comment will briefly examine decisions from states other than Virginia, analyzing their differing approaches to the problem of reconciling disparities
between state and federal bankruptcy laws.
II.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Homestead Exemption

State and federal courts in Virginia have long recognized the necessity
of liberally construing bankruptcy laws in favor of the debtor,s not merely
to shield the debtor's assets from creditors, but primarily to protect his
family,9 and to offer the honest debtor a chance to clean his slate.10 This
policy is especially true with regard to the homestead exemption, which
was traditionally viewed as a means of preserving the family home." In
12
the nineteenth century, when most homestead laws were enacted,
"home ownership was the norm and rental of apartments atypical."" s Protection of the home was generally thought to lend stability to the family
unit, prevent pauperism and stimulate self-interest in preservation of
property rights. 14 Today, the nature of the homestead itself has shifted
away from its historical definition as simply a dwelling place with surrounding land and appurtenances: 5 the homestead exemption given in
8. See, e.g., Roberts v. W.P. Ford & Son, Inc., 169 F.2d 151, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1948) (with-

out evidence of bad faith, failure of a bankrupt to account for all assets is no ground for
refusing discharge); In re Hale, 274 F. Supp. 813, 815 (W.D. Va. 1967) (discharge will not be
denied without proof of actual intent to defraud creditors); Wilkinson v. Merrill, 87 Va. 513,
516, 12 S.E. 1015, 1015-16 (1891) (debtor qualified as "householder" or "head of a family"
although his only dependent had been killed).
9. See Calhoun v. Williams, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 18, 21 (1879) (debtor without dependents
not allowed to claim homestead). But cf. Wilkinson v. Merrill, 87 Va. at 513, 12 S.E. 1015
(partially overruling Calhoun). In Wilkinson, the court allowed for a homestead exemption
to be claimed by a debtor whose only dependent, a 10-year-old grandson, had been murdered. The court may have been swayed by evidence which suggested that the creditor had
brought about the grandson's death in order to acquire the property sought to be held as
exempt. 87 Va. at 520, 12 S.E. at 1017.
10. 274 F. Supp. at 816.
11. See, e.g., Murphy v. City of Richmond, 111 Va. 459, 465, 69 S.E. 442, 444 (1910).
12. Most homestead laws in the South were enacted during the economic upheaval of the
Reconstruction era. Note, State Homestead Exemption Laws, 46 YALE L.J. 1023, 1030-31
(1937). Virginia's first homestead law was enacted in April of 1867. See 1866-67 Va. Acts
962.
13. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEo. L.J. 779, 805 (1974). In 1860, only one
of every 15 dwellings was renter-occupied. Id. at 805 n.153 (citing C. WRIGHT, ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1023 (1941)).

14. See Note, supra note 12, at 1030-31.
15. See In re Wilkes, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 957, 958 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 1976) ("persons living
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the present Code of Virginia' allows a debtor to exempt personal property as well as real property. It "is not a 'homestead' in any real sense of
the word, but is an exemption pure and simple."'" The broadening in
scope of the types of property which may be claimed under the homestead exemption serves to give more protection to the increasing numbers
of people who do not own homes.' s It does not, however, alter the homestead exemption's basic function, which has always been to protect the
helpless debtor,' and to prevent his20family from suffering undue hardship on account of his improvidence.
B.

The Definition of "Householder'2'

Only "householders" may claim the homestead exemption. 2 While the
current Virginia Code, last amended in 1979, refers only to "householder, ' 23 the terms "householder" and "head of a family" have long been
considered synonymous. 24 Virginia courts have traditionally defined a
"householder" as someone who owes a continuing legal and moral support
obligation. 25 However, from the bare language of the current Code definition of a householder, it appears that the only qualification now necessary
with" householder not limited to dependents living under his roof).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides that "[e]very householder or head
of a family residing in this State shall be entitled ... to hold exempt from levy, seizure,
garnishment or sale... his real and personal property... to the value of not exceeding
five thousand dollars." In addition, a householder who has not taken the full exemption of
$5,000 in real estate may exempt the balance in personalty. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-13 (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
17. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 958.
18. In 1978, 34.8% of the dwellings in this country were renter-occupied. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, 1980 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 793 (101st ed. 1980).
19. Linkenhoker's Heirs v. Detrick, 81 Va. 44, 56-57 (1885).
20. See 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) at 21. See generally Ulrich, supra note 3, at 129-31; Vukowich,
supra note 13, at 782-88.
21. See Ulrich, supra note 3, at 131-33 for a thorough discussion of this subject.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
23. The statute provides: "The word 'householder' as used in this title shall include any
person, married or unmarried, who maintains a separate residence or living quarters,
whether or not others are living with him." VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (emphasis in original). For purposes of statutory construction, the pronoun "him" in Virginia
statutes has long been recognized as extending to females as well as males. Richardson v.
Woodward, 104 F. 873, 876 (4th Cir. 1900).
24. Prior to the 1979 amendment, the former "Definitions" section in the Code read, in
pertinent part: "[t]he word 'householder'shall be equivalent to the expression 'householder
or head of a family' ... 2" VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 1976) (revised 1979) (emphasis
in original).
25. See, e.g., Oppenheim v. Myers, 99 Va. 582, 586, 39 S.E. 218, 219 (1901). The language
of the Virginia Code prior to the 1978 and 1979 amendments required that a householder be
"one who occupies such a relationship towards persons living with him as to entitle them to
a legal or moral right to look to him for support and who, in turn, has the duty of supporting such persons." VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Repl. Vol. 1976) (revised 1978, 1979).
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is that the person maintain "a separate residence or living quarters."287
The Cheeseman court justifiably described this language as ambiguous
One writer has noted that the amended definition might be interpreted to
exclude people who are deserving of the exemption, and benefit some who
are not.2 8 It has been suggested that the current definition was included
in the 1979 amendment to the Virginia Code as the result of In re
Wilkes.29 There, the court noted that "[a] literal interpretation of the language [of the Virginia Code prior to the 1979 amendment] would exclude
the homestead exemption to a divorced or separated father who otherwise
would be entitled" to the exemption, simply because his family did not
live with him, even though he had continuing legal and moral support
obligations.3
C.

The Precedent For Cheeseman

In February 1980, In re Thompson s1 was decided. It held that sound
public policy and the mandate of supremacy of federal bankruptcy laws
demanded that Virginia adhere to all provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act except for the federal exemption schedule.3 2 In Thompson, both
husband and wife had claimed exemptions. The trustee in bankruptcy
objected to the wife's claimed exemptions on the grounds that she was
not gainfully employed.3 3 The court ruled that Congress has "exclusive
jurisdiction to determine precisely what exemptions a debtor may
claim. 3s 4 The court further held that "[tihe Virginia statute is so worded
as to acknowledge that the only portion of 11 U.S.C. 522 affected is subsection (d) which enumerates certain property."3 5 Therefore, each debtor
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See note 23 supra.
27. 656 F.2d at 63.
28. See Ulrich, supra note 3, at 133. As an example, a recently divorced mother who
might be supporting children but is living with her parents would be excluded, while a college student who is being supported by his parents, but is living in an apartment, would
apparently qualify. Id.
29. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 957; see Ulrich, supra note 3, at 132 n.32.
30. 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 959. See also note 25 supra.
31. 2 B.R. 380 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (Supp. IV 1980), which enumerates property that may be
claimed as exempt under federal law. A detailed analysis of the exemptions allowed under
§ 522(d) of the Act is outside the scope of this comment. For a good discussion, see Schiffer,
The New Bankruptcy Reform Act: Its Implications for Family Law Practitioners,19 J.
FAM. LAW 1, 11-19 (1980-1981). As this provision of the Act relates to Virginia law, see
generally Ulrich, supra note 3, at 127.
33. 2 B.R. at 381.
34. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (Congress has power to establish uniform laws on bankruptcy). See also International Shoe v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1929) (a state may not
make laws that conflict with national bankruptcy laws).
35. 2 B.R. at 381. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981), which provides that
"[n]o individual may exempt from the property of the estate in any bankruptcy proceeding
the property specified in subsection (d) of § 522 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act (Public Law
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should be able to claim exemptions in a joint case as prescribed by federal law." The court also noted that Congress intended to allow states to
"'opt out' of certain,not all Federal exemptions, 3 7 and that "the intent
to provide exemptions to all debtors is evident in subsection (b) of [section] 522 ' s8 which
specifies that "an individualdebtor may exempt" cer39
tain property.
In June 1980, Thompson was reversed on appeal.40 The district court
ruled that since Virginia had "opted out" of the federal exemption
scheme, only Virginia's exemption laws should apply.41 The court reasoned that, since the wife had claimed a homestead exemption,4 2 she had
to qualify as a "householder" under Virginia law.43 However, she failed to

do so because "[tihe legislature did not. . . intend to grant double exemptions where there was only one residence occupied by two people,
that is, in this case, a man and his wife." 4 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on the "separate residence" requirement of Section 34-1 of
the Code,' 5 noting that statutes should be given a presumption of validity, and when possible construed so as to avoid a constitutional question. 4' The court also held that "the Virginia statute in question. . . continues to meet its original purported purpose to conserve the family home
(shelter) from forced sales." 7 Thus, the court reasoned, when a man and
95-598), except as may otherwise be expressly permitted under this title."
36. Section 522(m) of the Act provides that "[t]his section shall apply separately with
respect to each debtor in a joint case." 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. IV 1980).
37. 2 B.R. at 381 (emphasis in original). See 124 CONG. REc. S17,403-34 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978).
38. 2 B.R. at 381.
39. Id. (emphasis in original); see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. IV 1980) (cited in pertinent
part at note 4 supra).
40. In re Thompson, 4 B.R. 823 (E.D. Va. 1980).
41. Id. at 824.
42. It is interesting to note that the lower court's decision in Thompson does not mention
"homestead exemption." See 2 B.R. at 380-82. Thus the court arrived at its decision more
through a determination of which provisions of the Act are applicable to proceedings in
Virginia than by an interpretation of "householder" as it applies to the homestead exemption. It did, however, find that the 1979 amendment to Virginia Code § 34-1, which provides
that a "householder" is anyone who maintains a "separate residence," is contrary to public
policy because it encourages couples to separate in order to qualify for the exemption. 2
B.R. at 382. Upon appeal to the district court, the debtors objected to the trustee's assertion
of the homestead issue, since he had failed to raise it in the prior proceeding. However, the
district court allowed the issue to enter because the lower court had addressed it in its
opinion. 4 B.R. at 824 n.1.
43. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Curn. Supp. 1981).
44. 4 B.R. at 825.
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
46. 4 B.R. at 825.
47. Id. But cf. In re Wilkes, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 958 (homestead exemption is really a
pure exemption); VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (debtor may exempt real and/or
personal property as part of the homestead exemption). Most modern writers agree that, in
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his wife are living together, there is only one home to conserve, and therefore only one homestead exemption is intended."
When In re Thacker" was later decided by the Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Virginia, there was no mention of the prior decisions in the Thompson case, even though issues presented in Thackere
similarly required an interpretation of the "opting out" clause.5 1 The
court held that the purpose of the "opting out" clause of the Act was
merely to allow a state to prescribe its own schedule of exemptions in lieu
of those set forth in section 522(d). 2 Furthermore, the court's opinion
suggested that "if § 522 does not apply in Virginia, then no exemptions,
including the Homestead Exemption, are available to Debtors in this
State, since the only authority for such exemptions is found in §
522(b)(2)(A)." 53
The Thacker decision seems to be in accord with the bankruptcy
court's reasoning in the lower Thompson case. 5 ' Indeed, the wording of
Virginia's "opting out" clause 55 suggests that the Virginia legislature
never intended to proscribe any provisions of the Act except for the exemptions specified in section 522, subsection (d).56 Thus, section
reality, the amount of the homestead exemption is normally insufficient to allow the debtor
and his family to retain their home. See, e.g., Vukowich, supra note 13, at 806.
Virginia's exemption scheme provides for a $5,000 limit on the homestead exemption. VA.
CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The adequacy of the $5,000 limit has been questioned.
The purpose of this [homestead] exemption is to safeguard the debtor's home. This
purpose, however, is undermined by the inadequacy of the $5,00 limit. Because of
the rapid rise in property values caused by today's inflationary economy a homeowner
doubtless will acquire $5,000 worth of equity in his house in a very short time. Thus,
because the homestead exemption currently is limited to $5,000 and because the
debtor's equity frequently will exceed this amount, the debtor's home may be subject
to a forced sale. The debtor and his family consequently may lose their home[,] and
though they will get $5,000 that probably will be inadequate to permit the purchase
of a new home.
Note, The Failure of the Virginia Exemption Plan, 21 WM. & MARY L. Rxv. 851, 871
(1980).
48. 4 B.R. at 825.
49. 5 B.R. 592 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
50. Thacker was a consolidation of two cases with similar facts and issues. In each case,
the trustee had sought to sell real estate owned by the debtor and his wife as tenants by the
entireties. He argued that although § 522(b)(2)(B) of the Act allows an individual debtor to
exempt any interest in property owned by the entireties, Virginia had "opted out" of the
federal exemption scheme entirely. The trustee therefore contended that Virginia effectively
denied the use of any of the federal exemption provisions to debtors of the state.
51. In Thacker, the court questioned the extent to which Congress had intended to permit a state to preempt provisions of the Act. 5 B.R. at 594-95.
52. 5 B.R. at 594-96.
53. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
54. See text accompanying notes 31-39 supra.
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See note 35 supra.
56. The lower court in Thompson also addressed this point. 2 B.R. at 381.
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522(m), 57 the rule for joint cases, should be applicable to debtors in
Virginia.58

JR. ANALYSIS OF THE Cheeseman DECISION
A.

The Background and the Fourth Circuit's Ruling

Oliver" and Isabelle Cheeseman lived together as husband and wife in
their home which they owned as tenants by the entireties. They were
both gainfully employed and both contributed to the maintenance of the
household."9 In June 1980, they filed a joint petition in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 301,60 and each claimed the homestead exemption available to every "householder" or "head of a family." 61 The trustee
in bankruptcy took exception to Mrs. Cheeseman's claim, arguing that
under Virginia law she did not qualify as a householder or head of a family. After a hearing,6 2 the bankruptcy court held that, in light of the district court's decision in Thompson, Mrs. Cheeseman could not qualify as
a householder and should be denied a joint homestead exemption.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit focused on the definition of "householder" in the Virginia Code. The court noted that "no Virginia court has
considered whether a husband and wife, living together, may both be
deemed householders under this definition."" The district court had
avoided this issue by reasoning that since the purpose of a homestead
exemption was to conserve the home, the legislature intended to grant
only one homestead exemption for each residence.6 5 The Fourth Circuit
determined that it must use "established rules of statutory construction,"6 6 starting with the language in the Code definition of "householder. '6 7 The court found that the Code language is ambiguous, as it
could be interpreted to allow only one householder for each residence, or
it could also "be construed to permit any individual who contributes to
57. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 36 and accompanying text.

58. The Cheeseman court to some extent relied on reasoning similar to that expressed in
Thacker. 656 F.2d at 64. The Cheeseman decision, however, did not mention Thacker.
59. 656 F.2d at 61. It is reported that Mr. Cheeseman earned $22,773.30, and Mrs.
Cheeseman $6,311.79 in 1979, id., but no figures were furnished in the opinion concerning
the proportion of funds each contributed to the maintenance of the household.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. IV 1980) says that a voluntary case is commenced by the
debtor's filing of a petition in bankruptcy and that such filing constitutes an order for relief
under the Act.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).

62. Cheeseman v. Nachman, No. 80-2292 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 1980).
63. 656 F.2d at 62. For the opinion of the lower Thompson court, see text accompanying
notes 40-48 supra.
64. 656 F.2d at 62-63.
65. 4 B.R. at 825. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra. But see note 47 supra (exemption amounts are probably insufficient to allow debtors to protect their homes).
66. 656 F.2d at 63 (citing Richardson v. Woodward, 104 F. at 875).
67. The term "householder" is defined at VA. CODE ANN. § 34-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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the maintenance of a residence, without regard to whether others in the
same residence contribute to its maintenance, to be a householder ....
Under this latter construction, a husband and wife could both be
householders."68
This result appears to be an unlikely redefinition of the word "householder," ' and would have been unnecessary had the court chosen, as did
the lower court in Thompson,7 0 to rule that only section 522(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act was affected by the "opting out" clause.7 1 However, had
68. 656 F.2d at 63 (emphasis added). This dictum seems to recognize the potential for
homestead exemption claims by almost anyone who can show that he contributed in any
way to the maintenance of a residence. Fortunately, the opinion qualifies this view by holding that the exemptions should be available to each spouse living together, provided that he
or she contributes to the maintenance of the residence. Id.
69. Cf. 104 F. at 879 (wife may claim the homestead exemption where she is the debtor,
owns the real estate and runs the family business and "the husband cannot and does not
claim the homestead exemption"). Id. (emphasis added). The Cheeseman court cited this
case as authority for construing Virginia Code § 34-1 "accoiding to the established rules of
statutory construction," see note 67 supra and accompanying text, while apparently ignoring the language in the latter part of the opinion.
See generally Vukowich, supra note 13, at 841-45; see also Ulrich, supra note 3, at 13133. Professor Ulrich argues that Virginia's exemption statutes are in need of revision, and
proposes that "householder" be defined as "an individual who is the primary source of support for some person including himself." Id. at 153. He notes, however, that:
This [proposed] definition opens the very real possibility that at least two people in a
family could each claim a homestead exemption. Two parents working to support
themselves and their dependents is a clear example. This possibility exists under the
present definition of householder in § 34-1 only if the parents maintainedseparate
residences.
Id. at 153 n.149 (emphasis added). Professor Ulrich apparently did not contemplate the
eventuality of the Cheeseman analysis-that a court could construe the phrase "maintains a
separate residence" to include both spouses as long as they both contribute to the maintenance of a single home.
70. See 2 B.R. at 381.
71. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled that § 34-3.1 applied to only § 522(d) of the Act when it
decided In re Snellings, 10 B.R. 949 (Bankr. W.D. Vs. 1981), just prior to the Cheeseman
decision. In Snellings, the debtors were joint owners of their residence, and had both filed
homestead exemptions against creditors who sought to have the court enforce a judgment
lien on the real estate involved. The defendants owed $10,000 without interest on a demand
note, in which they had waived the homestead exemption right pursuant to § 34-22 of the
Virginia Code. The debtors sought to have the creditors' complaint dismissed, because they
had filed separate homestead exemptions of $5,000 each for a total of $10,000, and because
the waiver could be avoided under federal law. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. IV 1980) (regardless of waiver, debtor may avoid a judicial lien which impairs any exemptions to which
he is entitled under § 522(b)). The court reasoned that statutes had to be construed with
regard to prevailing facts, and decided that the words "householder shall include" in the
1979 amendment to § 34-1 of the Virginia Code should be read as an enlargement of the
meaning, rather than a limitation. Since the homestead laws are matters of public policy,
the court held that the statute should be -interpreted to allow each debtor to claim the
homestead exemption in jointly held property. 10 B.R. at 952-54. The court concluded that
"[this Virginia Code Section [§ 34-3.1, the 'opt out' clause] only deals with § 522(d)," and
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the circuit court adopted this reasoning alone, it would have voided by
implication the Virginia statute defining a "householder." Virginia courts
had never construed the definition so as to include both spouses, but all
72
provisions of the federal law are meant to apply equally to joint debtors.
Thus, a construction of the Virginia law which allowed only one spouse to
be a "householder" would fly in the face of the federal legislation.
It is well settled that a state's bankruptcy laws, to the extent that they
conflict with those of Congress, are suspended.73 It is equally well established that a statute should be construed, if possible, so as to uphold its
validity.7 4 The Cheeseman court therefore chose to construe the statutory

definition of "householder" in a manner that would validate the state law
and effectuate "Virginia's policy that the homestead provisions be liberally construed. 7 5 In addition, the court noted that a construction which
allowed only one spouse to be a householder as long as the couple lived
together would be contrary tQ public policy, since it would encourage
76
couples to separate in order to claim two homestead exemptions.
B. Conflicting State and Federal Laws in Other States
A good deal of judicial effort has been put forth towards interpretation
of the words "householder" or "head of a family.

' 77

However, there are

very few reported cases in which the court of a state which has "opted
out" of the federal scheme7 8 has attempted to resolve a conflict between
its own laws and the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
Florida courts, like those in Virginia, traditionally have relied on the
notions of support and moral obligation in determining who qualifies as
"head of a family. '79 Moreover, a recent Florida bankruptcy decision, In
thus "does not affect the Virginia debtor's right to use 11 U.S.C. § 522(a), (b), (c)and (e)(m)." 10 B.R. at 954.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. IV 1980).
73. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1917).
74. 4 B.R. at 825. While the Cheeseman court did not enunciate this policy, its influence
is evident from the court's use of statutory construction rather than invalidation to resolve
the potential conflict. See also 104 F. at 874 (where there is no construction of a state statute by state courts, or where there is a conflict with federal law, the bankruptcy court will
construe the statute so as to carry out the intent of the act of Congress). But see 2 B.R. at
382 (even though enacted in good faith, a statute should be declared void if it violates the
State Constitution).

75. 656 F.2d at 63.
76. Id. This concern was also expressed in the lower Thompson case. See 2 B.R. at 382.
See also Ulrich, supra note 3, at 133 n.34.
77. For a survey of some cases in which the term "householder" and "head of a family"
have been construed, see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy 522.05, at 522-19 n.13 (15th ed. 1981).
78. Other states besides Virginia which have chosen to opt out are: Arizona, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri (legislation pending), Ne-

braska, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee and Wyoming. Id. %522.02, at 522-11 n.4a.
79. See In re Rivera, 5 B.R. 313, 315 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980).
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re Barnes,0 indicates that the state will recognize only one "head of a
family" ' for the purpose of claiming a homestead exemption. Florida apparently still adheres to the "presumption that the husband is head of
the family," 2 even when the wife's income is greater and the home is
owned solely in her name. 83 Also, the husband cannot choose to permit
the wife to stand as head of the family. s4 It appears that the Barnes court
chose not to recognize a conflict between the Florida statute and federal
law. Rather than deciding, as did the Fourth Circuit in Cheeseman, that
the statute should be given an interpretation that is consistent with the
provisions of the federal law, the Barnes court retained a construction
based strictly on state precedent. The effect of this decision is to frustrate
the Act by denying Florida debtors the use of the joint exemption provisions to which the Congress intended they should be entitled. 5 Further, a
reading of Florida's "opt out" statute indicates that the state legislature
only intended to prohibit debtors from using the federal exemption
schedule.8 In the past, Florida courts hive shown willingness to stretch
the interpretation of "head of a family. 8 s7 In Barnes, however, the court
80. 4 B.R. 600 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) (wife not allowed to claim homestead exemption
in a joint proceeding because she did not qualify as a "head of a family").
81. Florida's homestead exemption may be claimed only by "a head of a family." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 222.01 (West Supp. 1981).
82. 4 B.R. at 602 (ermphasis added).
83. Id. at 601-02.
84. The court, citing Abernathy v. Gruppo, 119 So.2d 398 (Fla. App. 1960), noted that:
[A]n able bodied husband cannot abdicate his presumptive position as the head of a
family and as long as the family relationship of a husband and wife remains intact,
the husband is deemed to be head of the family unless he is unable to discharge his
duties due to permanent illness, incarceration or mental incompetence.
4 B.R. at 602. Moreover, "[t]o qualify to be head of a family in this state, there must be at
least two persons living together in relation of one family and one of them must be the head
of that particular family." Id. (emphasis in original).
85. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra. Some writers have expressed concern that
the "opting out" clause of the Act would serve as a means by which states could enact laws
which would nullify the federal legislation. See, e.g., Sommer, The New Law of Bankruptcy:
A Fresh Start for Legal Services Lawyers, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 4 (1979). In Florida it
would appear that a similar effect has occurred due to judicial construction of an existing"
state statute.
86. Florida's opting out clause provides, in pertinent part, that "[r]esidents of this state
shall not be entitled to the federal exemptions provided in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code
of 1978.... Nothing herein shall affect the exemptions given to residents of this state by
the . . .Florida Statutes." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West Supp. 1981).
87. See, e.g., Davis v. Miami Beach Bank & Trust Co., 99 Fla. 1282, 128 So. 817 (1930)
(widow supporting incapacitated adult son qualified as "head of a family"). But see In re
Rivera, 5 B.R. at 316 (single man can not claim head of family exemption based on cohabitation with an unmarried woman). In Rivera, although the debtor had fathered a child by
the woman with whom he was living, there had been no legal determination of fatherhood.
Thus, the court held that there was no permanent and continuing support obligation; therefore, he could not qualify as "head of a family." In so ruling, the court stated that "actual
support, temporary or even a sustained support, is not by itself determinative of this question." Id. at 315.
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rendered a statutory interpretation which not only frustrates the legislative intent of the Act, but also contravenes Florida's own policy of construing exemption claims liberally in favor of the debtor.88
The Cheeseman case demonstrates how courts may engage in judicial
legislation in order to resolve a conflict between state law and the Bankruptcy Act. In contrast, Barnes illustrates the danger that a court may
continue to give deference to antiquated state laws89 and thereby frustrate the goals of the Act, and defeat the fresh start doctrine.
The Ohio legislature has wisely amended its homestead law so as to
grant the exemption to "[e]very person who is domiciled in this state." 90
Further, in two judicial decisions which disallowed the fixing of liens that
would have been permitted under the state statutes, Ohio courts correctly
decided that there is no authority in the Bankruptcy Act for a state to
prescribe anything other than exemption entitlements. 91 In both cases,
the courts held that the Act of Congress prevailed over a conflicting Ohio
statute which would have prohibited the debtors from claiming a lien exemption that was available under federal law.9 2 The Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Ohio recited that "[i]f a state opts out of the
federal exemption, it does not affect the debtor's power under [11 U.S.C.
section 522] subsection (f)."19 3 One can reasonably infer, therefore, that
the Ohio courts, if faced with a case similar to Cheeseman or Barnes,
would invalidate a state statute which was in conflict with the joint ex94
emptions provision of the Act.
Thus, at present there are three ways in which courts have resolved the
problem of a conflict between state and federal laws under the Act. The
Florida court upheld a strict construction of state law which is clearly
contrary to the joint exemption provision of the Act. The Fourth Circuit
chose to compromise, validating the Virginia statute by giving it an interpretation in conformity with the federal law. Ohio's position, on the other
88. See, e.g., Vandiver v. Vincent, 139 So. 2d 704, 707 (Fla. App. 1962).
89. Note that the Barnes court ignored the rule that a state statute, to the extent that it
is in conflict with federal law, is suspended. See International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S.
261, 263-64 (1929); note 73 supra and accompanying text. In re Barnes could and should be
overruled on this basis.
90. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.66(A) (Baldwin 1979) (emphasis added). The former version of the Ohio Code specified that "[e]very person who is the chief support of a family, or
who is ... paying alimony, maintenance or other allowance" was entitled to claim the exemption. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.66 (Baldwin 1975).
91. In re Fisher, 6 B.R. 206, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Cox, 4 B.R. 240, 242
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.662 (Baldwin 1979) states, in pertinent part: "[p]ursuant to ... 11 U.S.C.A. 522(b)(1), this state specifically does not authorize debtors ... to exempt property specified in... 11 U.S.C.A. 522(d)."
92. 6 B.R. at 210; 4 B.R. at 243.
93. 6 B.R. at 210 (citing 3 COIXuaRS ON BANKRUPTCY,
522.29 (15th ed. 1979)).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) (Supp. IV 1980).
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hand, seems to be better reasoned. The Ohio bankruptcy courts have
made it clear that state statutes which conflict with the provisions of the
Act will be invalidated. Further, the Ohio legislature has revised the state
homestead law so that it conforms with the joint exemption provisions of
the Act.9 5 This position obviates the need for the type of judicial legislation that was found necessary in Cheeseman. Also, it precludes state
courts from giving credence to antiquated state exemption laws which
deny debtors the full measure of relief intended by the Act. Moreover, it
demonstrates that the state is exercising an appropriate and timely review of its exemption lawsY8 The Virginia and Florida legislatures would
be wise to follow the example of Ohio and make necessary revisions in the
exemption laws of their respective states.
IV.

THE EFFECTS OF THE

Cheeseman DECISION

A. Cheeseman Shows the Need for Revision of Virginia's Exemption
Laws
The Virginia homestead exemption law has long been considered to be
antiquated and insufficient to ensure a fresh start under current economic
conditions. 97 The Cheeseman decision will go a long way toward liberalizing the Virginia law, since it will enable Virginia debtors to obtain a
greater amount of protection than was formerly available. However, the
need for judicial legislation of this type is indicative of a need for legislative action. For example, under the Bankruptcy Act a couple in a joint
bankruptcy proceeding would be able to claim $7,500 each, or $15,000 total as a homestead exemption." Following the decision in Cheeseman, the
same couple in Virginia is entitled to only $5,000 each,9" or $10,000 total,
provided both contribute to the maintenance of the household.100 Thus,
even though the Virginia statute has been revised twice in recent years,0 1
there is a considerable disparity between the amounts granted under Virginia law and those prescribed in the federal exemption scheme.102
In addition to the homestead exemption, parts of the Virginia Code
allow a debtor to exempt a loom, a spinning wheel, a horse and three
hogs;103 or if he is a farmer, an extra horse or mule, a rake and a pitch95. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
96. See text accompanying note 109 infra.
97. See Note, supra note 47, at 868-69. See generally Ulrich, supra note 3, at 140-41.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1),(m) (Supp. IV 1980).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).

100. 656 F.2d at 63.
101. The exemption amount was raised from $2,000 to $3,500 in 1975, VA. CODE ANN. §
34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1975), and to $5,000 in 1977. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
102. For a comparison of the federal provisions with those of Virginia, Maryland and the
District of Columbia, see Comment, supra note 3, at 853-59.
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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fork.'" It is significant to note, however, that there is no provision for
exemption of an automobile in the Virginia Code.101 Thus, it is apparent
that Virginia's exemption laws are in need of a general revision.
B. Virginia's Homestead Law Fails to Achieve the Goals of the Bankruptcy Act
The Bankruptcy Act as passed in 1978 was an amended version of the
original House Bill, which had called for a considerably more generous
homestead exemption. 10 6 Apparently, the amended version represents a
compromise between the House Bill and the Senate amendment, which
resulted in the amount of the homestead exemption being reduced and
1 7
allowed states to circumvent the federal laws by affirmative legislation. 1
The Senate Report indicates a desire to allow states some flexibility in
08
adjusting local laws to the standard of living in their particular area.2 It

has been suggested that Congress, by allowing a state to opt out only by
affirmative legislation, "has ensured that states exercising the option [to
deny the use of the federal exemptions] will reexamine their own exemption statutes and make a conscious choice between the two provisions.""
If so, Virginia has failed to achieve the goal of Congress by neglecting to
update its exemption laws fully when it chose to opt out of the federal
scheme.
Since states have the option of proscribing the use of the federal regu104. Id. at § 34-27. A full analysis of the inadequacies of the present exemption scheme is
outside the scope of this comment. For a good discussion, see Note, supra note 47, at 86876. It is important to note that these "Poor Debtor's Exemptions" rely on the same "householder" definition in § 34-1 which the fourth circuit ruled could be joint in a federal bankruptcy case.
105. The federal exemption scheme allows a $1,200 motor vehicle allowance in addition to
the homestead exemption. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
106. The homestead amount in the original House bill was $10,000. See H.R. RP. No. 95595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 126, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6087.
The intent of the original bill was apparently to let the states set levels of exemptions commensurate with the area's standard of living, then allow the debtor to select the more
favorable of state or federal exemption schedules. Id.
107. 124 CONG. REc. H11,095 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
108. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5787, 5792. The Senate Report stresses that it favors the fresh start policy, but
objects to "instant affluence," as might be possible under the original House version. See
also Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L. Rev. 445, 449-53, 48586 (1960) (differing conditions and relevant interests make it desirable to allow states to
prescribe their own exemption laws). Although it has been argued that allowing states to
preempt the federal legislation frustrates the Act's aim of uniformity, see, e.g., Rendleman,
LiquidationBankruptcy Under the '78 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 575, 651-52 (1980),
the Constitutional requirement of uniformity is geographical, not personal, and so it is
within the scope of states' powers to determine the rights of debtors within their borders.
Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
109. Comment, supra note 3, at 865.
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lations, they should use that power as a means of enhancing the opportunity for an honest debtor to obtain a fresh start, and thus implement,
through state regulation, the Congressional intent underlying the Bankruptcy Act. It is in a state's best interest to offer exemptions that are
adequate to prevent the debtor's "leaving the courtroom in a barrel,"'110
becoming a public charge,"" or being forced back immediately after discharge into the 2credit market and the circumstances which precipitated
his insolvency."
V.

CONCLUSION

The Cheeseman court has concocted a somewhat resourceful interpretation of "householder," enabling the court to validate Virginia's statute
while still complying with the federal law concerning joint debtors. The
Fourth Circuit has also followed Virginia's public policy of protecting the
debtor's family and enabling him to achieve a meaningful fresh start after
discharge. Other courts faced with antiquated state exemption laws have
occasionally adopted similar means of breathing new life into anachronistic legislation."13 Yet courts should not have to make artful interpretations of outdated statutory language in order to achieve just results; statutory revision simply is not within the province of the judiciary. But
neither should debtors be condemned to suffer undue hardship under an
archaic system of state exemption laws, which a court like that in the
Florida Barnes case may refuse to invalidate. The answer to this dilemma
lies with the legislature.
The ruling in the Cheeseman decision should substantially improve the
chances that spouses as joint debtors in Virginia will be able to retain
enough of their property to enable them to achieve a fresh start. Allowing
joint debtors to claim dual exemptions, as was intended by Congress
under the Bankruptcy Act, is a meaningful step in the direction of bringing Virginia's exemption laws up to date. The next step is for the Virginia
legislature to take its cue from Cheeseman and to undertake a meaning14
ful, realistic revision of the Virginia exemption laws.
Henry N. Ware, Jr.
110. See Rendleman, supra note 108, at 649.
111. Ulrich, supra note 3, at 129.
112. See Lacy, South Carolina'sStatutory Exemptions and Consumer Bankruptcy, 30
S.C.L. RE V. 643, 688 (1979).
113. See, e.g., Phillips v. C. Palomo & Sons, 270 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1959) (truck-trailer
held exempt in lieu of "two horses" and "wagon"); Patten v. Sturgeon, 214 F. 65 (8th Cir.
1914) (automobile exempt in lieu of "carriage").
114. Legislation was introduced in the 1982 Virginia General Assembly which would have
abrogated Cheeseman by limiting the homestead exemption to the "householder providing
the primary maintenance" for a residence. The bill was passed by the Senate but was killed
in the House Committee for Courts of Justice. S.B. 317 (amended Feb. 18, 1982) (emphasis
added).

